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A GENERATION OF LAW TEACHING

Roscoe Pound*
HIRTY-SIX years ago (September, 1903) as Dean Bates was
talcing up law teaching as Tappan Professor of Law at Michigan,
I was delivering an inaugural lecture as Dean of the Law School of
the University of Nebraska. In this generation of law teaching we
have seen the academic law school rise to a commanding position in
professional education, the law teacher gain a position among the
leaders of the profession, the growth of co-operation between bar associations and the association of law teachers, the development of
co-operation between bar examiners and the law schools, and general
adoption by the profession of the views of law teachers as to the preliminary education to be required of those entering upon the study of
law. Taking the country as a whole, much more progress was m~de
in legal education in that generation than had been made in the two
which preceded it.
· For the country as a whole, the low-water mark as to admission
to the profession had been reached about I 890, and a movement for
a better system began to make itself felt in the last decade of the
nineteenth century. At that time our jurisdictions were somewhat
evenly divided in adherence to three systems. In one system admission
to practice in all courts might be had through any of a number of local
courts. This system sacrificed all other considerations to a desire to
make the machinery of admission convenient of access to applicants.
In consequence, the lowest local standard set the level and in many
places the level had sunk very low under the conditions of the times,
especially in our large cities. Another system sought a compromise
between convenience of applicants and maintaining of standards. It
was a system of local admission to the bar for all but the highest court
of the jurisdiction, but of admission to the bar of that tribunal by the
court itself. In most of the states where this system obtained, however,
the centralized control was exercised only in form. In a third system
there was a centralized authority in charge of all admissions. But in
a majority of the states employing this system legislation required,
or customary practice had established, delegation to local committees,
and in others a loose practice of relying on such committees had
reduced this third system, in its workings, to the low level of the first.

T

* Dean

Emeritus of the Law School and University Professor at Harvard.-Ed.

1939

J

A

GENERATION OF LAW TEACHING

Some examples of how things were done in those days are worth
recalling. About 1890 a young man in the community in which I
practiced was unable to pass the easy examination before three members of the local bar appointed by the local judge of the court of
general jurisdiction of first instance. In fact, he had never read seriously or consecutively a single law book. His father was a close personal friend of a federal judge who sat in another city. He got the
latter to appoint a committee of three busy lawyers during a busy trial
term. The committee assumed the matter was a mere formality and
without any examination recommended admission. He was admitted
to the bar of the federal court accordingly, and on his certificate was
admitted as of course in the state courts. In another case of which I
have personal knowledge, three men who failed the easy local examination in the state court, directed only to ascertaining what they had
read and their knowledge of a few definitions and elementary conceptions, went across the line to a local court in an adjoining state. As
they did not intend to practice there, the court was not much concerned about their qualifications and admitted them. They then went
back home and were admitted on their certificates.
Pennsylvania was much more careful than other states. The
supreme court had retained the colonial rules and had done much
to keep up a certain uniformity in local practice as to admission. What
could happen even there is illustrated by In re Splane.1 Splane had
three times failed to pass the examination for admission to the bar
of the supreme court, which, if passed, would entitle him to practice
in the lower courts of the state. The facts were known in Alleghany
county where he lived, so he went to Cambria county where, as he
was an outsider and not to practice there, the matter was treated
quite casually and he was admitted. The statute of 1887 provided
that one who had been admitted in any court of common pleas, on
producing the certificate of the presiding judge that he was of reputable professional standing and unobjectionable character, should be
admitted in any common pleas court in the Commonwealth. Splane
had no difficulty in obtaining a certificate. He took it back to Alleghany county and applied for admission there. His application having been denied, he applied to the supreme court for a writ of
mandamus. The court denied the writ, holding, what has now become the settled doctrine, that it was not competent for the legislature to compel the courts to admit any one. Legislation could only
. 1

123 Pa. St. 527, 16 A. 481 (1888).
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be in aid of the power of the courts to admit. But it took a long time
for this doctrine to establish itself. A generation later one legislature
undertook to make honorable discharge from military service with
ten per cent or more of disability aquired in the W odd War a ground
of admission without examination, and the legislature of another
state enacted reinstatement of a lawyer whom the supreme court
had disbarred for :flagrant misconduct. I suspect that if Splane had
not failed before and the fact been known locally but had only been
afraid of the local examination and gone to another county to seek
an easier one, he might have succeeded. It was only in flagrant cases
that the local bar would intervene to stop such practices.
Law schools were held back for two generations by the conditions
with which they had to compete. It was not until a few courageous
leaders had demonstrated that they could maintain standards far in
advance of those fixed by legislatures and courts and yet avoid bankruptcy, that general and thoroughgoing progress could be made. The
pioneer's idea of a natural right to practice law has been dying slowly
and shows some signs of life even today.
While examinations were perfunctory and certificates of office
study easily obtained, many states, in order to induce students to go
to law schools, provided for admission on law school diplomas. But
this privilege came to be bestowed indiscriminately and, as bar examinations improved, became a means of evading those examinations
by persons who ought to take them. It was opposed steadfastly by
the best schools in the present century and has substantially disappeared. The objects of the school examinations and of the bar examinations are not entirely identical. It is not wise to leave professional
training wholly to the teachers nor wholly to the bar. Here as
everywhere else a balance is called for. The law schools must insist
primarily on a scientific outlook upon the legal order and the technique of the law. The bar examination has the additional purpose of
insuring knowledge of what the experience of the profession has led
it to deem important. Co-operation of teachers and bar examiners
will keep these purposes adjusted to each other.
• Not the least of the progress which has been achieved in a generation is in the character of the bar examinations. The old examinations were of Mr. Gradgrind's girl number-twenty define-a-horse type.
Definitions, maxims, and abstract propositions to be given in the words
of some text writer were called for, without requiring any understanding of the concrete legal precepts behind them or of their application.
I well remember conducting an examination at which the chairman was
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a believer in this type. The candidate seemed to know the Blackstone
quiz book by heart, and the chairman was rejoiced. Presently to the
question "define an incorporeal hereditament" the answer came, "something issuing from the realty." As this was not quite Blackstone's
formula, the chairman paused to indicate that an inaccuracy called for
correction. This gave me my chance and I interposed, asking for an
example. The prompt and confident response "a tree" showed the
value of such an examination better than any argument. But this sort of
question is still in use in some corners of the land.
When a better type of question came into vogue it was often and
long sadly misused. Law teachers of the teens of the present century
will remember a dogmatic veteran examiner in one of the most important states who put questions out of the reports of the state, not
always giving the significant facts or stating them accurately. Indeed,
on the basis of a case in which a body supposed to be that of the victim
of a homicide was not satisfactorily identified, he believed that corpus
delicti meant a dead body. His questions called for a short and positive
answer-"judgment for A" read his model answers with a five or six
line statement of some legal proposition. He held that there were "no
degrees of error." An answer was one hundred per cent right, or it was
wholly wrong. If the result given was that reached by the court in the
case from which the question was drawn the answer was right. If not, it
was wrong. If the course of decision in the state fluctuated, as it sometimes did, the right answer today might be wholly wrong tomorrow and
vice versa.
It requires no great experience to teach that the art of examination
is a difficult one. Where questions are taken from cases in the reports
it takes care as well as practice to insure that all the facts relevant to the
proposition announced by the court are set forth. It takes care as well as
acquired skill to frame questions with due regard to the time alloted
for answers. Permanent boards with accumulated experience and conferences of examiners have been delivering us from many crudities
which characterized the beginnings of the system of central examinations.
In academic circles today it is fashionable to decry examinations,
and a tendency to relax is not unlikely to spread from the arts college
to the law schools and from the latter to the authorities in charge of
admission. Whatever may be the sound view with reference to the
quite different requirements of the college, for the purposes of the
law school, relaxation and, even more, abandonment of the examination
system would be serious mistake. It is a most useful training for the

a
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lawyer to acquire the power to write well under pressure. It is most
useful for him to learn to utilize his knowledge and exercise his acquired skill under restrictions of time and even at high speed. The law
school examinations should be thought of not as a test of work done but
as a test of acquisition of technique and of ability to use acquired information. Nor should the bar examinations be relaxed, much less abandoned. There will always be need of the· corrective of a test of the
candidate's acquired knowledge of and power to apply what the profession feels that the newcomer to its ranks should know.
An especially significant and in its effects far-reaching feature of
the progress made in the past three decades is the breaking down of
the suspicion and distrust and development of understanding and
cooperation between the law schools and the organized profession, and
between the practitioner and the full-time law teacher. It is not so long
ago that law teachers feared bad results from bar examiners prescribing
subjects of examination, holding that this meant that they would ·or
would seek to dictate law school curricula. It is not so long ago that
when some bar examiners would ask law teachers for copies of the
questions set in school examinations a cry would go up that the academic law schools were attempting to dictate bar examinations. For the
bar to dictate curricula or the schools to dictate bar examinations would
be equally mistaken. State bars and bar associations and bar examiners
should demand high standards of the schools and leave details of
courses and teaching method to them. Students should be held to prepare for bar examinations as for other examinations and not demand
that their school examinations be repeated, to be examined only on what
they were examined upon in law school, or even necessarily the same
type of question to which they have become used. True, there is the
perennial difficulty of the cram course or cram school or crammer,
existing solely to fill the candidate with answers to be disgorged at the
examination and thriving on the tendency of busy examiners to repeat
their questions in a predictable cycle. There is the temptation to conduct
law schools which prepare for the bar examinations but not for the bar.
Law school teachers, however, have learned how by taking pains in
framing papers to defeat the cram tutor or cram coach and make it
obviously not worth the students' while to resort to him. Local procedure, upon which bar examiners obviously must insist much beyond
what the national law schools can profitably teach, has been the chief
reliance of the cram tutors. As procedure is coming to be simplified
and unified so that the schools may do more for the subject and the
amount of sheer memorizing of arbitrary details is minimized, the
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relation of school examinations to bar examinations will be much simplified. Moreover, the rapid improvement in bar examination technique
which has gone on largely in consequence of conferences of bar examiners is enabling the examiners to circumvent the cramming agencies
as the law schools have been able to do. The better understanding of
each other by practitioners and teachers, which has grown up in a
generation in bar associations, in the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and in the American Law Institute will have
increasingly good effects.
An important feature of the development of understanding between
the academic law schools and the bar is the increasing employment of
law teachers upon practical problems of improving the law and the
administration of justice. It has done much for the law and much also
for legal education. The work of law teachers in the framing of uniform state laws, in the Restatements under the auspices of the American
Law Institute, in the framing of rules of court to govern procedure, and
in or in connection with the judicial councils in many of the states,
speaks for itself. But these things have been well for the schools no less
than for the law. They have led teachers to study subjects as a whole
instead of keeping to the confines of the parts of subjects which can be
taught. No part of the law can be neglected in preparing to teach or in
teaching any other part. The teacher's great problem is what to leave
out. He must leave it out of his classroom presentation, but not out of
his knowledge of the subject he is to present.
Improvement in teaching method in the schools in the present
century, taking the country as a whole, has been equally radical and
significant. Although better methods had been worked out and had
proved themselves a generation before, in 1900 a great majority of the
law schools were still teaching by the definition, crisp phrase, maxim
and abstract formula method of the text book era. In able hands it was
better than the teaching of Latin in the days when one learned the
Latin grammar by heart-when the teacher said "give section 302" and
the pupil rose and recited "the supine in um is used after verbs of
motion to express the purpose of the motion," without the least idea
what kind of a motion, whether physical or parliamentary, was meant.
It was better than that when well done, but it was too much of that
type. And it was not always in good hands. The retired judge or broken
down practitioner, from whom the faculties of law schools a generation ago were frequently recruited, could find a line of comfortable
lea.c,t resistance in the postulated finality of a text. I remember visiting
a law school about the time I went into law teaching and listening to a
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teacher who had some reputation as a successful drill master. A well
known student's text book on real property was being recited section
by section with clear expositions from time to time of particular words
or phrases. One of the students, after a statement in the text had been
recited, called attention to a recent decision of the supreme court of the
state which apparently ran counter to the proposition laid down in the
book. But such a possibility could not be admitted. The student was
promptly suppressed by the teacher with an emphatic "our author says"
and a reading aloud of the text.
Improved teaching methods have done much for the law also.
The work of law teachers upon case books in the two generations since
Langdell's pioneer Cases on Contracts prepared the way for the Restatements under the auspices of the American Law Institute and for
the great text books which have been brought out by Wigmore and
Williston and Beale and Scott.
When I delivered my inaugural lecture in 1903, I had to argue
against the then current idea of an inherent natural right to practice
law, against consequent legislative prescribing of low standards, and
legislative interference with endeavors of the courts to impose even a
reasonable minimum of necessary qualifications. I had to urge the bar
to action and point out the ill effects on legal education and conse- .
quently on the administration of justice which grew out of indifference
on the part of the legal profession. The American Bar Association had
been urging better things for twenty-five years. But in 1903 it still had
a small membership and relatively little influence. Also I had to speak
of the schools which kept up the apprentice type of training for the
profession and of the money-making schools whose chief end was to
pay dividends to their incorporators or yield an income to their managers. Such things are with us still to some extent here and there. But
in those days there was a complete absence of proper supervision of
them by any agency of the profession, or by those who passed on the
training of candidates applying for examination, and unrestricted power
of gr'anting degrees. Study by correspondence was generally accepted as
a compliance with the statutory requirement of reading in the office of
a practitioner, and one aggressive correspondence school came very near
persuading a state legislature to require acceptance of its certificates in
lieu of the bar examination. But by this time the state bar associations
were beginning to resist such propositions. The bulk of those who
came to the bar came from so-called office study. But much of this was
perfunctory, if not pretence. Easygoing giving of certificates of office
study was generally the rule. Substantially all these things which it was
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necessary to speak of in any treatment of American legal education a
generation ago are matters of the past.
Most of the impetus behind the great and rapid improvement which
has taken place in a generation came from the American Bar Association (founded in r878) and state bar associations following its lead.
Next to these the Association of American Law Schools (organized in
1904) has been an effective agency. For a time, it threatened that the
two would not work together. But with the development of better
understanding between practitioners and teachers the suspicions of sinister designs entertained by each with respect to the other have dissipated and for many years they have co-operated with increasing
effectiveness. The foundation of improvement was in substituting
boards of examiners or standing committees as examining bodies for the
judges in the local courts or committees of the local bar named for each
case. In Pennsylvania, Delaware and Vermont this practice had been
continuous from the end of the eighteenth century. But their boards
or committees served without compensation or even allowance for
expenses and no great things could be expected of busy lawyers, competent to be examiners, under such an arrangement. In r88o, New
Hampshire provided that the permanent board which it had set up
should be allowed its expenses out of the fees paid by the applicants for
examination. By 1890 six states had such a system. It is now substantially universal. Following better examinations came better requirements of legal education, then better requirements of preliminary education, and later better means of assuring the character of those examined. As one looks back, it is hard to realize what things were from
which we have reached the system of today. If much remains to be done
here and there, the profession is well aware of it and the organized
bars and bar associations are zealous and active to urge it. The apathy
of the bar in the last century is only a memory.
Along with progress in the machinery of admission and its operation has gone rapid but solid progress in the law schools-progress in
requirements for admission, in standards of work, in organization of
study, in building up of the teaching force, in graduate study, and in
training of teachers and research. To speak only of one of the latest
developments, the institutes conducted by teachers under the auspices
of bar associations, or even, as in Virginia last spring, conducted jointly
by bar associations and law schools, have manifest possibilities for the
law, for the profession, and for the student. Return to the common-law
institution of an organized profession, responsible for standards of training, qualifications, conduct and discipline, and with powers correspond-
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ing to the responsibility, is making for continuance and increase of such
team work between the law schools and the bar.
But while the law teachers of today may look back with pride on
what has been achieved in a generation, there are many things confronting them with which they must wrestle as their own problems
with which the organized profession cannot help them. The common law
is a law of the courts, and the teaching of the common law began and
evolved as a teaching by practitioners in the courts. As things had come
to be in the United States, especially in view of the deprofessionalizing
process that went on in the last century, the passing of legal education
from the law office to the academic law school was inevitable. Yet there
are possibilities in the intimate contact of law faculties with faculties of
arts that we must consider. The expansion of the arts curriculum, the
idea of equivalence of subjects and minute subdivision into courses,
so that a college teacher may teach what seems good to him .without
disturbing any general scheme, has not given law teachers a good model
for the work of a professional school where the general scheme of what
must be taught cannot be ignored. If, with a necessarily limited number
of teachers any qne of them puts the stress in the wrong place and omits
what the general plan calls for in order to do something it does not call
for, the balance of the student's training is disturbed. This may not
matter in a general cultural education. It may matter very much in
training for a practical profession. In recent years there have been some
signs of a tendency in law teachers to give instruction in what interests
them personally for the moment at the expense of what, on a consideration of the whole field- of law teaching, students with the limited time
afforded by a reasonable period of study should be mastering.
Again, the preliminary training of the law student, before he comes
to the study of law, must be left to the colleges. But their purpose is
not primarily to pr~pare for the professional schools, and college
authorities may justly object to shaping of their curricula by law
schools as the high schools object to shaping of theirs by the colleges.
The law schools must make the best of what has been done for its
graduates by the college, being assured that it will be infinitely better
than to take immature and not fully trained students from the secondary schools. Yet looking back over forty years of teaching ( for I began
law teaching in r899), I seem to see certain effects of college teaching
of the social sciences to students with no training in logic or in languages requiring accurate attention to accidence, grammar and context.
I seem to feel an increasing difficulty in teaching the technique of legal
reasoning to students with a predominantly literary training, satisfied
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with plausible speculation and clever writing, with no sound basis in
exact information, no clear philosophical background and no habits of
consecutive thought. Certainly the contrast between the feeling of
students today and those of yesterday about a course in the law of real
property is significant. It did not seem hard to the student of my generation, although it took up more of the curriculum than it does now.
The first year course in property in I 8 89-90 covered more ground than
has generally been attempted in recent years, and covered it thoroughly.
Today, the subject seems to bewilder students. The things which are
simply so and must be learned as such, and the exact logical development of propositions to reach assuredly predictable results are not
congenial to the habits of thinking and study of a generation not
raised on the Latin grammar, the Greek verb, and compulsory mathematics.
More intimate contact of our universities with English universities
and the increasing number of English-trained teachers in our institutions have had many good results. Undoubtedly the insistence on a
more reasonable ratio of teacher to student and closer personal relations
between teacher and taught which has come to us from England has
led to improvement of the conditions of some years ago when teachers
often lectured to impossibly large classes and could give little or no
attention to individuals. Here, however, as in other cases of which I
have spoken, what is needed is a reasoned balance between conflicting
demands. Where in college and professional school the stress is
on limitation of numbers, as an end in itself, the demand for legal
training as opening a path to political activity and as a foundation for
public administration or even for business is lost sight of. If the
best colleges carry limitation too far, important groups in the community, ambitious of finding a place in public life, are cut off from the
professions or forced to seek to enter them with inferior preparation.
If the best law schools carry limitation too far, many ambitious men
will have to turn to a lower type of school and perhaps agitate for
reducing the hard won standards we were able to set up while the
doors were open to all who could attain them. To do the best that
can be done for the most who call for education and can meet its
requirements should be the policy of our institutions in what we hope
to preserve as a democratic land.
Another group of problems face the law teacher today in an era
of educational experimentation. All education is affected by the modes
of thought which have come into fashion since the World War. From
insisting on continuity we have come to see only discontinuity. From
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insisting on principles we have come to doubt their reality and to see
only details. From a fashion of reducing all things to systematic simplicity we have come to insist· on unrelieved complexity. From faith
in generalization we have come to see only single cases and single rules.
From an ideal of law as a body of logically interdependent precepts,
we have come to reject logical interdependence and many would reject
logic also. The rising importance of administration in our polity, the
effect of increasing delegation of the applications of legal standards
to administrative agencies, the preponderance of negligence cases in the
law reports of today, the difficulties of applying the standard of due
process of law in the urban industrial society of today in view of traditional ideals shaped for a rural, pioneer, agricultural society-all
these things, with their tendency to emphasize public law in our picture
of the legal order, make law teachers restless under the curricula of
the past and eager to work out new ones by a process of trial and error.
The trial is going on and it cannot go on without its due proportion of
error. Yet only in this way, very likely, can we work out a curriculum
for the future as effective as the one worked out in its day for the past.
One thing, however, should be borne in mind. The law teacher must
remember that law is a practical subject and that it cannot be judged
wholly from the books. The full-time teacher is necessary for the
scientific teaching and writing and research that are called for by the
social problems of the legal order of the time. But he must be careful
not to form general ideas from case books in which anomalous cases
and difficult cases of application, admitting of stimulating discussion,
brilliant developm_ent of analogies, and argument as to the choice
of starting points for reasoning are most significant, without the check
of experience in practice to make him aware of the extent to which the
general course of judicial action for the overwhelming bulk of the cases
which come to the lawyer is entirely predictable. At the other extreme is
the practitioner part-time teacher, who sees things, as he sees them in the
office and the forum, that is, as single cases calling for solution as such
and not connected in any systematic whole. How to impart something
of each into the other is a real problem of the law school administration
of today.
Close contact of law teachers with the other faculties in a university,
highly desirable as it is in a time of unification of the social sciences and
necessary bringing to bear of all knowledge upon the questions of each
special field, to some extent hinders the effective understanding between
practitioner and professor. The give-it-up philosophies which are in
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vogue in academic circles for the moment are no help to either, but
may easily lead the latter to ideas at which the experienced common
sense of the former draws the line. Again, it must be said, law is a
practical subject. Even if no absolute measure of values can be proved,
the law has found a practical one through experience developed by
reason. It does not follow that all judicial and administrative action
must be at large as some teachers, full of the new wine of relativist
philosophy and up-to-date psychology, have been assuming. In a university, where one must not be out of date in his ideas, law teachers may
be led too easily to give over the quest for an order of reason into
which judicial decisions may be put, and to take the easy path of an
economic interpretation of each case-something very different from
an economic interpretation of the development of legal institutions and
doctrines looked at in their whole course.
One of the specific problems of law teaching, an old one but perennial and ever recurring, is maintaining a balance between information
and technique, between training with an eye chiefly to practice and
training for the higher tasks of the lawyer; for legislation, juristic
writing, creative juristic thinking, and wise participation in affairs. The
apprentice-type law school of the last century stressed the one exclusively. Many thought that the academic law school of the beginning of
the present century by way of reaction put too much emphasis on the
other. In the whole history of legal education the two have tended
continually to get out of balance. The university teachers of law on
the Continent two generations ago, who were so engrossed in systematic development of the principles found by analytical study of the
Roman law that they refused to look at the sections of the codes under
which they lived, have been succeeded by a type of teacher who can
see nothing but those sections and bounds his teaching by the covers
of the codes. The historical jurists whose case books a generation ago
developed doctrines from obscure fragmentary reports in the Year
Books have been succeeded by a generation to which historical continuity is an illusion and each case is a phenomenon sufficiently grounded
in its own phenomenality.
From the standpoint of training for practice, information must be
stressed. The practitioner must know certain things as Kipling says the
sailor must know his ropes, awake or asleep, drunk or sober. From the
juristic standpoint there is a tendency to neglect the information which
after all should be at the foundation of all attempts by the student at
research and creative juristic thought. From either standpoint there is
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a tendency to over-stuff curricula which a wise law school administration must always resist. It cannot be too mindful of Coke's motto-non multa sed multum.
In the last century, as, in a period of maturity of law, text writers
sought to organize and systematize the confused mass of concrete legal
precepts in Anglo-American law, they turned for systematic ideas to
the Continental writers on the Pandects. More than one department in
our law was for a time held back in its development by having been
forced into a systematic pigeon hole of the modern Roman law. Some
parts of our law are still embarrassed by having been subjected to this
process for two generations. In this case we cannot put the blame on
contact of law writers with an academic faculty. They turned for ready
made system to the only systematic books available instead of working
out one from our own materials. But an analogous phenomenon about
which the law school world must be thinking is becoming manifest and
is clearly in large part attributable to academic environment. The long
separation of teaching of the law of the land from the universities in
England and America led the academic teachers of politics and government to turn to Continental treatises on public law for systematic
ideas with a consequence that much has been imported into the books
which is fundamentally out of line with our legal polity. With the rise
of administrative bureaus and agencies of every sort and development
of administrative law, the close contact of law faculties and arts faculties, which ought to be a good thing for each, is stimulating the development of an imported public law with its postulate of absolutism
to replace the common-law postulate that government is carried on
under the law.
Many other problems for law faculties remain, each of which could
of itself be the subject of a whole paper. Are we wise in letting the
German doctorate of philosophy, as adapted in our faculties of arts
and sciences, dictate the form of graduate legal education? The general science of law, Roman law, and comparative law cannot well be
given a place in the undergraduate curriculum. But those who are in
training to teach law should be well grounded in these subjects which
are fundamental for the jurist. Research in ignorance of them is no
substitute for them and the Ph.D. model should not compel our law
faculties to give them over in order to conform to an academic fashion.
Again, reaction from the teaching of Blackstone and of books on "elementary law" founded on Blackstone led the law schools generally to
give up the idea of a general introductory course. It may be that our
law is not yet so systematized that such a course is practicable. Through
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case books and now through the Restatements and treatises our law
teachers are putting system into particular subjects. As the commentators put system into particular subjects of the modern Roman law and
the Pandectists followed after a long interval with system of the law
as a whole, perhaps when system in each department of the common law
is thoroughly worked out, system of the whole will come. Whether the
history and system of the common law can be taught profitably in our
law schools is a question worthy of study. The increasing need of different types of lawyer and hence of adaptation of legal education to
these types upon a common basis suggests that some such general survey of the law may have to be provided.
One thinks, too, of the question of a prescribed pre-legal course in
college and what its content should be and the constant pressure to
inject more subjects so that the pre-legal course and the professional
course shall between them include "everything a lawyer ought to
know." No course can ever do this and the lawyer of the future, like
the lawyer of the past, will have to be content with learning how to
get up subjects for the time being and where to go for sound instruction
and information. So, too, as to the question of the length of the course
and apportionment of it between college and law school. In our zeal
to include a maximum of what it would be desirable for the lawyer to
know we must not forget that law ought to be a learned profession,
and so must not push general culture out of the program. We must
not forget that there is such a thing as keeping young men in school
too long. They ought not to come to the bar later than twenty-five and it
might be better if students could be out of secondary school and college at nineteen and come to the bar at twenty-three. Well rounded,
cultivated men, qualified to be leaders such as our American polity demands, who at the same time have mastered the technique of our law,
know enough of its history to understand its possibilities for the social
order of today and enough of its principles in the fundamental branches
to become e:ffective advisers and advocates and later sound judgessuch should be the ideal.
"Taught law," says Maitland, "is tough law." A taught legal tradition, molded through the traditional technique of the lawyer to the
ever changing circumstances of time and place, is one of the most
enduring of human institutions. Law schools are our best guarantee of
vitality in the law, losing sight neither of experience nor of reason but
keeping them in balance and working along with the courts in preserving and handing down that frame of mind which has been the
strength of the Anglo-American legal polity.

